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THE THEORY OF QUALIFICATIONS AND 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
The differences existing in the rules of the conflict of laws in 
the various countries has given rise to the question whether the 
rules of the forum should be interpreted as adopting the foreign 
law in its totality, including its rules of the conflict of laws, or 
whether they should be deemed to incorporate only the foreign 
internal law. This problem is that of renvoi.1 A problem of a 
different character, though equally fundamental, may arise, even 
if the rules of the c9nflict of laws of the countries involved in a 
given case are alike, because of a difference in .the meaning of 
the concepts used. "Nationality," "domicil," "the law of the place 
of contracting," "the law of the place of performance," and "the 
law of the place where the tort was committed" are all legal con-
ce.pts which may be determined in more than one way. The coun-
tries differ also on the question of what constitutes immovable and 
what movable property, on the meaning of "capacity," "form," 
"substance," "procedure," and in their definition of various other 
terms upon which the application of the foreign law depends. The 
question thus presenting itself is what law is to determine the 
meaning of the above terms. The problem referred to has given 
the greatest concern to the continental writers and is generally 
discussed by them under the title of "theory of qualifications." 
Continental Law 
From the standpoint of continental theory, the problem of the 
conflict of qualifications is one of the most difficult problems 
in the conflict of laws. Let us consider first the principal problems 
1See (1910) 10 Columbia Law Rev. 190, 327; (1918) 27 Yale Law Jour-
nal, 509; (1919) 29 ibici. 214; (1918) 31 Harvard Law Rev. 523. 
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involved and thereupon the general theories which have been 
advanced for the solution of the problem. 
Domicil. Domicil plays an important role in the Anglo-Amer-
ican and South American systems of the conflict of laws. On 
the continent and in a few of the South American countries it 
has been supplanted by the principle of nationality. The law of 
domicil is invoked even in these countries, however, when the 
nationality of the party is unknown and under other circumstances. 
Suppose now that the question before a New York court is whether 
a citizen of the State of New York, formerly domiciled therein, 
has lost his New York domicil and become domiciled in France. 
Should the New York courts determine the question of domicil 
solely with reference to their own law or should they inquire into 
the French law of domicil? The question is of considerable prac-
tical importance because of the fact that the continental definition 
of domicil does not always agree with the Anglo-American. In 
some countries of Europe domicil denotes merely the <:enter of a 
man's affairs without the connotation of permanent home.2 A 
similar problem might be presented with reference to England, 
whose rules governing domicil differ in various respects from the 
American law, for example, as regards the reverter doctrine and 
as to the capacity of a married woman to acquire a separate domicil 
from her husband. 
The continental writers maintain with respect to the question 
the greatest variety of views. Some agree with the French Court 
of Cassation that the question of domicil involves merely a ques-
tion of fact and that a conflict with respect to the definition 
of domicil cannot, therefore, arise. 3 Others concede that the 
notion of domicil is one of law and fact, but assume that the 
Roman conception of domicil has become the universal rule, 
'See Art. 102, French Civil Code; Art. 16, Italian Civil Code. The 
French call it a de facto domicil to distinguish it from a "legal" or 
"authorized" domiciL The latter is a preliminary step to naturalization 
and confers upon the foreigner the enjoyment of all civil rights. See Art. 
13, Civil Code. 
"The French Court of Cassation declines therefore to review the find-
ings of the trial court with respect thereto. Cass. Oct. 22, 1900, Clunet 
1900, 964. The lower courts determine the question in accordance with the 
French notion of domicil if the party resided in France. If the residence 
was in another state they profess to apply the national law of the party. 
App. Nancy, May 8, 1875, Sirey 1876, 2, 137; App. Toulouse, May 22, 1880; 
Sirey 1880, 2, 294. See also App. Brussels, Jan. 18, 1888, Dalloz 1888, 2, 249. 
In Germany it has been held by the Imperial Court that the loss of a 
domicil should be determined with reference to the law of such domicil. 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1884, 28. See ibid., 1895, 393. 
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so that there are actually no differences in regard to the ques-
tion.~ Those conceding that· the definitions of domicil vary 
in the different countries reach conclusions. which are con-
nected more or less with their general theories concerning the 
conflict of laws. For example, some authors, supporting the prin-
ciple of the "personality" of laws, would allow the national law 
of the party to govern the question.5 Weiss6 would allow an 
exception to the rule with respect to countries in which the law 
of doJ.?icil controls status and capacity. In such a case he sees 
no escape from the application of the law of the forum. Others 
would refer the decision to the law of the forum in all cases in 
which the party was a resident of the forum, and in all other cases, 
to his nationallaw.7 Still others maintain that the lex fori is the 
only law that can furnish a solution of the problem in any case.8 
The German writers determine the question of domicil in accord-
ance with the law of each country· in which the party may be 
deemed domiciled.9 If the application of this test should result 
in several domicils, Niemeyer10 would choose the one having the 
closest connection with the question before the court, that is, 
•Bar, Private International Law (Gillespie's transl.) 112. The Roman 
definition of domicil is as follows: "Et in eodem) loco singulos habere 
domicilium non ambigitur, ubi quis larem rerumque ac fortunarum suarum 
summam constituit, uncle rursus non sit discessurus; si nihil avocet, uncle 
cum profectus est, peregrinari videtur, quo si rediit, peregrinari iam 
destitit." Code X, 40, 7. 
•3 Weiss, Traite de droit international prive (2d ed.) 323; Valery, Manuel 
de droit international prive, 113; Durand, Essai de droit international 
prive, 373. 
"3 Weiss, op. cit., 323. 
11 Contuzzi, 1 codice civile nei rapporti del diritto internazionale privato, 
134; Despagnet & de Boeck, Precis de droit international prive (5th ed.), 
501 ; Vincent & Penaud, Dictionnaire de droit international prive, "Domicile" 
nos. 2-3. 
"Kahn, 30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher fiir die Dogmatik, 79; Levis, Das inter-
nationale Entmiindigungsrecht des deutschen Reichs, 24. 
"Neumann, Internationales Privatrecht, 51; Niemeyer, Das internationale 
Privatrecht des biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 71; 1 Zitelmann, Internationales 
Privatrecht, 178-179. "To have a domicil in a certain state." says Zitel-
mann, "signifies therefore . . . in the first place that a person has a 
domicil in such state according to the law of such state . . . The 
judge has to find the domicil to be so established irrespective of the 
principles governing domicil in his own law." 1 Zitelmann, op. cit., 178-179. 
10Das internatioitale Privatrecht des biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 73. Ac-
cord. Barazetti, Das internationale Privatrecht im biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche 
fiir das deutsche Reich, 22; 1 Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht, 220. 
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generally the older domicil. Zitelmann11 would accept the older 
domicil if neither of the domicils was in the state of the forum. 
If one of them was in such state, he would choose that domicil. 
Nationality. The law governing the acquisition and loss of 
nationality varies greatly in the different countries, so that it often 
happens that a person is claimed as a citizen or subject by several 
governments.12 In countries determining the capacity of parties 
and various other questions in the conflict of laws in accordance 
with the law of nationality, this condition gives rise to a serious 
problem. Should the law of a particular country under these 
circumstances adhere in its system of the conflict of laws to the 
principle of nationality or should it yield in such a case to that of 
domicil? If the law of nationality is to be retained, what law 
is to determine the nationality of the party for the purpose of the 
litigation? 
Where the law of the forum claims the party as a subject this 
law will naturally control. Courts and writers are agreed upon 
this point.U But where the party has two foreign nationalities 
there is the greatest difference of opinion as to the one that should 
prevail. The only express legislative provision on the subject is 
to be found in the Japanese Civil Code, which provides that the 
nationality acquired last is to govern.14 The French Court of 
Cassation has applied the provisions of the French Civil Code 
"1 Zitelmann, op cit., 180. Accord: Habicht, Das internationale Privatrecht 
nach dem Einfiihrungsgesetze zum biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche, 230; Niedner, 
Das Einfiihrungsgesetz zum biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche (2nd ed.) 85; 
Kuhlenbeck, Das Einfiihrungsgesetz (Vol. 6 of Staudinger's Kommentar 
zum biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche) 146. See also Neuman, op. cit., 52. 
Planck prefers in certain cases the law of the place of residence to that 
of the older domicil. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (3d ed.), Vol. 6, 110. 
"'Bisocchi, Acquisto e perdita della nazionalita nella legislazione com-
parata e nel diritto internazionale, 112; 1 Sieber, Das Staatsbiirgerrecht im 
internationalen Verkehr 190; 1 Weiss, op. cit., 255. 
'"So expressly Art. 16 of the Japanese Civil Code. In support of this 
proposition see also Cass. Beige, June 12, 1876, Clunet 1878, 522; A:pp. 
Toulouse, Jan. 26, 1876, Clunet 1877, 235; Court of First Instance of 
Luxembourg, Jan. 5, 1887, Clunet 1887, 674; Swiss Federal Tribunal, June 
10, 1876, Clunet 1876, 231; Despagnet, op. cit., 369-370; Esperson, Condizione 
ginridico dello straniero, 560; Habicht, op. cit., 229; Kuhlenbeck, op. cit., 
145; Niedner, op. cit., 83; Niemeyer, Das internationale Privatrecht des 
biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 64; Das internationale Privatrecht im Entwurf 
eines biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 25; 6 Planck, op. cit., 111; Valery, op cit., 
321; Venzi, Foro italiano, 1904,1, 761-762; 1 Weiss, op. cit., 784; 1 Zitel-
mann, op. cit., 175. 
"Art. 16, Civil Code. To the same effect Barazetti, oP. cit., 22; Niemeyer, 
Das internationale Privatrecht des biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 64, VorschHige 
und Materialien zur Kodifikation des internationalen Privatrechts, 125. 
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relating to nationality in such a case.15 The lower courts, however, 
have sometimes abandoned the principle of nationality in these 
cases and substituted for it the law of domicil.l6 A number of 
writers would allow the law of domicil to govern whenever the 
domicil of the party was in one of the foreign states concerned.U 
Some would do so only if the foreign nationalities were acquired 
at the same time.18 If they were acquired in succession some10 
would accept the nationality which was acquired last; others/0 the 
one that was acquired first. If the party had no domicil in either 
of the foreign states some authors would accept the nationality 
of the state in which the party had his residence.21 Weiss22 would 
hold in such a case that he is a subject of the state the law of 
which presents the closest similarity to that of the forum. Fiore23 
and Planck24 would prefer in this case the nationality based on 
blood relationship. Esperson25 would do so only if the law of 
the forum accepted the principle of blood relationship. Wachter26 
would apply the lex fori in accordance with his general theory 
concerning the conflict of laws. Bartin27 would leave the judge 
without any fixed criterion in this case. Valery28 has suggested 
ucass. June 2, 1908, Revue de droit international prive, 1909, 247. 
1•App. Aix, July 9, 1903, Clunet 1904, 150. To the same effect Bar, 
op. cit., 205; Kahn, 30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher, 69; Laurent, Avant projet de 
revision du Code Civil, art. 18, par. 3. 
1"Habicht, op. cit., 230; Niedner, op. cit., 84; 1 Weiss, op. cit., 785. See 
also 6 Planck, op. cit., 111. 
:ISBarazetti, op. cit., 22; Kuhlenbeck, op. cit., 145; Niemeyer, Das inter-
nationale Privatrecht im Entwurf eines biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 25. 
""Barazetti, op. cit., 22; Habicht, op. cit., 230; Kuhlenbeck, op. cit., 145; 
Niemeyer, Das internationale Privatrecht des biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 64; 
V orschlage und Materialien zum Entwurf eines biirgerlichen Gesetz-
buchs,25. 
"'1 Zitelmann, op. cit., 176. 
"'Barazetti, op. cit., 22; Niemeyer, Das internationale Privatrecht im 
Entwurf eines biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 25. 
::1 Weiss, op. cit., 785. 
"'Fiore, Le droit internationale prive (4th ed., Antoine's translation) 
No. 332. 
"'6 Planck, op. cit., 112. 
"'Op. cit., 568. In cases of naturalization Esperson chooses the national-
ity that corresponds most closely to the lex fori. Op. cit., 578. 
"'24 Archiv fiir die civilistische Praxis, 265. 
""Clunet 1897, 471 ; Reprint 39. 
""Op. cit., 328. 
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that the question depends upon the intention of the parties. Venzi29 
would allow the plaintiff to prove his nationality in conformity 
with the law of the State of which he claims to be a subject. 
Pillet30 would respect the law of the place of birth and also the 
nationality claimed by virtue of blood relationship. If one party 
should base his contention upon the jus soli and the other upon 
the jus sanguinis, the French judge would be unable, according 
to Pillet, to proceed with the case until the parties had agreed upon 
the question of nationality. 
Law of the Place of Contracting. Another question involving 
a "point of contact" of a transaction with the law of a given juris-
diction arises in connection with the law of contracts. Suppose, 
for example, that A in New York makes an offer to B in Petrograd 
which the latter accepts by mail. By the law of New York the 
contract is completed when the letter of acceptance is posted. By 
the law of Russia31 the contract is not completed until the letter 
of acceptance reaches A. The same situation would be presented 
if B lived in Belgium,32 Italy/3 Rumania,34 and certain other coun-
tries.35 If a dispute should arise with reference to the contract the 
"'Foro italiano, 1904, 1, 762. 
30L' ordre publique, 89-91. 
313 Klibanski, Handbuch des gesammten, riissischen Zivilrechts, 5. 
32App. Liege, Feb. 15, 1876, Pasicrisie, 1876, 2, 145; Apr. 22, 1885, Pasi-
crisie, 1885, 2, 335; Clunet 1886, 369; App. Brussels, Dec. 1, 1884, Pasi-
crisie, 1885, 2, 303; Clunet 1886, 369, Feb. 17, 1905, Revue de droit inter-
national prive, 1908, 288; Trib. Com. Louvain, July 26, 1887, Gazette du 
Palais, 1887, 2, 606; Trib. Com. Bruges, July 28, 1888, Pandectes Periodiques, 
1889, 380; Trib. Com. Antwerp, Aug. 27, 1906, Clunet 1909, 235. 
33 Art. 36, Comm,ercial Code; Art. 1098, Civil Code; App. Milan, Dec. 11, 
1888, Clunet 1892, 512; Cass. Turin, Apr. 26, 1881, Foro italiano, 1881, 1, 
620; Jan. 13, 1891, Monitore dei tribunali 1891, 189; La Legge 1891, 1, 
519; Clunet 1891, 1026; Cass. Rome, March 23, 1892, Monitore, 1892, 711. 
See also Giurisprudenza sui codice civile, art. 1098 No. 324 and cases there 
cited; Giurisprudenza sui codice di commercia, art. 36 and cases there 
cited. So as to jurisdiction of courts, Cass. Turin. Feb. 9, 1884, Monitore 
1884, 268; Oct. 27, 1905, Monitore 1906, 101; App. Milan Dec. 1, 1888, Moni-
tore 1889, 55. 
"'Com. Code, Arts. 35-38. 
""App. Lyons, June 27, 1867, Dalloz 1867, 2, 193; App. Chambery June 8, 
1877, Dalloz 1878, 2, 113; App. Orleans, June 26, 1885, Dalloz 1886, 2, 
135; App. Aix, Nov. 23, 1908, Dalloz 1909, 2, 61; Clunet 1909, 746; App. 
Nimes, June 15, 1900, Dalloz, 1901, 2, 415; March 4, 1908, Dallozz 1908, 2, 
24S. So as to jurisdiction of courts, App. Bourges, Jan. 19, 1866, Sirey 
1866, 2, 218; App. Lyons Apr. 29, 1875, Sirey 1875, 2, 263. The French 
courts favor more commonly the theory that the contract is made where 
the letter of acceptance is mailed. App. Pau, July 16, 185~ Dalloz 1854, 
2, 205; App. Lyons June 1, 1857, Dalloz 1858, 2, 21; App. \..:aen, June 15, 
1871, Dalloz 1872, 5, 111; March 30, 1889, Gazette du Palais, 1889, 1, 825; 
App. Douai, March 25, 1886, Dalloz 1888, 2, 37; App. Poitiers Nov. 4, 1886, 
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answer would depend upon the law governing the contract. Let 
us assume that both New York and the foreign country are com-
mitted to the doctrine that the law of the place of contracting 
governs. The la'\Y" of New York says that the contract is made in 
Russia. The law of Russia says that the place of contracting is 
New York. Which law is to determine the place of contracting? 
Continental writers generally determine the obligation ·of con-
tracts in accordance with the expressed or implied intention of 
the parties. The place where the contract is deemed made is, 
therefore, at most of secondary importance.36 Many writers deny 
that the rules relating to the completion of contracts by correspond-
ence from the point of view of time can be rationally invoked for 
the solution of the problem from the standpoint of the conflict of 
laws. For these reasons the case suggested above is rarely dis-
cussed by the authors. Those that have dealt with it have, as a 
rule, applied the law of the forum.37 Some writers have suggested 
that the lex loci should be determined in accordance with the inten-
Gazette du Palais, 1886, 2, 907; Jan. 21, 1891, Dalloz 1892, 2, 249, May 14, 
1901, Dalloz 1902, 2, 12; Oct. 28, 1907, Revue de droit international pri~. 
1908, 222; App. Rennes, Dec. 15, 1891, Clunet 1892, 912; App. Paris, Feb. 
5, 1910, Dalloz 1913, 2, 553. The Court of Cassation regards it as a 
question of fact. Cass .. Aug. 6, 1867, Sirey 1867, 1, 400; Dalloz 1868, 1, 35; 
Dec. 1, 1875, Dalloz 1877, 1, 450; March 30, 1881, Sirey 1882, 1, 56; 
Journal du Palais, 1882, 1, 125. 
""The following presumptions have been proposed: (1) the common 
nationality of the parties, Surville, Clunet 1891, 369-370; (2) the common 
domicile, Pillet, Principes de droit international prive, 441 ; Cours de droit 
international prive, '325; 20 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 
prive, 153; (3) the law of the domicil of the debtor, Bar, op. cit., 443-
446; (4) the national law of the offeror, Cass. Turin, Jan. 13, 1891, Clunel 
1891, 1026. Some would apply the law which would retard the 
formation of the contract longest, Bartin, Clunet, 1897, 476, Reprint 44-45; 
Chretien, Clunet 1891, 1028; Dreyfus, L'acte juridique en droit international 
prive, 363; others the law of both states, Barazetti, op. cit., 54; Hinden-
burg, Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee, 1897, 
263, 285; 2 Zitelmann, op. cit., 164. Surville favors the common domicil 
in the absence of a common nationality. In the absence of a commop 
nationality and domicil he would apply the le:r domicilil of the party whose 
domicil was established in the country to which the other party belonged by 
nationality. In the absence of any of the above fads he would apply the 
law of the party who had taken a preponderating part in the negotiations. 
Clunet 1891, 369-371. The Institute of International Law adopted the 
following resolution: "If the contract has been concluded by correspond-
ence, the le:r loci contractus shall not be taken into consideration and the 
law of the domicil or commercial establishment of the offeror shall be 
applied." 22 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international prive, 289-292. 
"'Despagnet & de Boeck, op cit., 893; Clunet 1898, 271; 1 Diena, Diritto 
commerciale internazionale, 476, 479 ; Kahn, 30 Jhering' s J ahrbiicher, 99 ; 
Surville et Arthuys, Cours elementaire de droit international prive (6th 
ed.) 306; Valery, op. cit., 956; Louis Perez Verdia, Tratado elemental de 
der~cho internacional privado, 188; 4 Weiss, op. cit., 373. 
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tion of the parties, and, when the intention of the parties is not 
clear, by the judge in the light of the surrounding circumstances.38 
Law of the Place of Perfornzance. According to the law of 
some countries, including Germany39 and most states of this 
country/0 the obligation of contracts is determined with reference 
to the law of the place of performance. Where the contract is 
silent regarding the place of performance such place must neces-
sarily be determined by law. Suppose, now, that A of this country 
and B of Germany enter into a contract containing no express pro-
vision regarding the place of performance and that the American 
and German laws differ on the question where such place of per-
formance is. If the action is brought in the United States in a 
state determining the rights and duties arising out of contracts by 
the law of the place of performance, we should have identical rules 
of the conflict of laws governing the case in the two countries 
involved, but a question would be raised regarding the law that 
should decide the preliminary question or point of contact, that is, 
what the place of performance is. 
The above problem has remained practically unnoticed. Gen-
erally the assumption is made that the law of the countries con-
cerned is identical with respect to the place of performance, but 
this is often erroneous in fact. The suggestion has been made 
also41 that the law governing the contract should determine the 
question, but it is obvious that if the law of the place of perform-
ance controls the obligation of the contract in the particular system 
of the conflict of laws, such suggestion involves a begging of the 
question at issue. Kahn42 points out that in the case under con-
sideration only the law of the forum can furnish a solution of the 
preliminary problem. 
Law of Place Where Tort is Contntitted. A problem similar 
to the one just discussed may present itself with respect to torts. 
The physical act causing the harm may take place in one state or 
country and the effect or effects resulting therefrom may occur in 
38Gemma, Propedeutica al d.iritto internazionale privato,-La cosidetta 
teoria delle qualificazioni, 113-114; Niemeyer, Vorschlage und Materialien 
zur Kod.ifikation des internationalen Privatrechts, 242. 
"'Imperial Court, Oict. 13, 1894, 34 R G 191 ; Apr. 28, 1900, 46 R G 193; 
May 26, 1900, 46 R G 112; A11r. 21, 1902, 51 R G 218; June 16, 1903, 55 
R G 105; July 4, 1904, 14 Zeitschrift fiir internationales Privat-und 
Strafrecht, 285; April 26, 1907, 18 ibid., 177. 
40Beale, 23 Harvard Law Rev. 82, 194. 
"Gemma, op. cit., 115-116. 
"Kahn, 30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher, 99; Dreyfus, op. cit., 308, note 1. 
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some other state or country or in several other states or countries. 
Although the law of the various countries concerned should agree 
upon the lex loci delicti as the rule governing torts in the conflict 
of laws, one of them might regard the place of the physical act as 
the lex loci and another, the place where the effect occurred,43 
How is the place where the tort is committed to be ascertained? 
Kahn44 appears to be the only writer who has considered this 
problem. As in the preceding cases he finds it necessary to deter~ 
mine the question in accordance with the law of the forum. 
Movable or immovable property. The law may regard movable 
property for certain purposes as immovable property. Rights in 
realty may be assimilated by law either to immovable or to movable 
property. Artificial categories may thus be created with respect 
to which the law of the situs of the property, the law of the state 
governing the particular juridical relationship, and the law of the 
forum may differ. The question thus presents itself: What law 
shall determine the character of the property interest in question? 
The statement is generally made that the questions must be 
determined by the law of the situs of the property.45 Some of the 
leading writers contend, however, that this rule is incorrect and 
that the law governing the particular juridical relationship should 
control. According to these writers the law of the situs should 
govern with respect to property rights as such, but if the question 
arises in connection with the law of succession, matrimonial prop-
. erty, or contracts, it should be determined by the rule applicable 
in the conflict of laws to succession, matrimonial property or 
"'Zitelmann points out that the place where a wrongful act is committed 
may be determined differently in criminal law and in the law of torts. 
2 Op. cit., 479. Zitelmann himself prefers the law of the place where the 
muscular contraction took place. 1 Op. cit., 112; 2 op. cit., 480, 485. 
4430 Jhering's Jahrbiicher, 100. 
"Cass. April 5, 1887, Clunet 1889, 827; Sirey, 1889, 1, 387; Bartin, Clunet 
1897, 251; Reprint 29; Bustamente, Orden publico, 256; 2 Cattellani, II, 
diritto internazionale privato, 424; Cavaglieri, La distinzione fra atti civili 
e commerciali e Ia Iegge che Ia determ'na. II Diritto Commerciale, 1910, 
48-49; Despagnet & deBoeck, op. cit., 355; Diena, I diritti real!, 70; Prin-
cipi di diritto internazionale, 75; Sui Iimiti all' applicabilita del diritto 
straniero, 27-28; Jette!, Handbuch des internationalen Privat-und Stra-
frechts, 106; Jitta, Renovation of international law, 125 ; Kosters, Inter- · 
nationaal burgerlijk· Recht, 148; 7 Laurent, Le droit civil international, 
201; Schaffner, Entwickelung des international en Privatrechts, 80; Surville 
& Arthuys, op. cit., 254; Valery, op. cit., 879-880. The question whether 
a movable is in contemplation of law annexed to some immovable in 
another state is deemed controlled by the law of the situs of the movable. 
2 Gierke, op. cit., 226; 2 Zitelmann, op. cit., 131; 0 L G Bayern, Nov. 11, 
1882, 38 Seuffert's Archiv, no. 161. 
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contracts.46 Niemeyer47 suggests, however, that such rule must 
yield to the law of the situs whenever the latter is mandatory. 
Kahn48 insists upon the fact that if the application of the law of 
one state or country or that of another depends upon the character 
of the property as movable or immovable, the preliminary question 
regarding the character of such property must, for want of any 
other law that can control, depend upon the law of the forum. 
Substance or Procedure. Anglo-American courts regard the 
statute of limitations as belonging to procedure. Elsewhere the 
question is generally deemed to affect the substance.49 Suppose, 
now, that a contract is made in France, under the law of which 
the action is barred by the statute of limitations, and that the suit 
is brought in New York, under the law of which the action is not 
barred. Will the law governing the contract, that is French law, 
or the law of the forum determine the question whether the action 
can be maintained? 
So far as the continental writers have discussed this problem 
they have supported the law of the forum.50 
Substance, Capacity or Porn~. The following cases have been 
much discussed in connection with the conflict of qualifications. 
(1) A and B, subjects of the state of X and domiciled in such 
state, make in the state of Y a joint will which conforms to the 
law of the state of Y. Is the will valid in the state of X if the 
law of the state of X declares joint wills to be void? We may 
assume (a) that the law of the state of Y regards the matter as 
one of form and the law of the state of X, as one going to the 
substance or to capacity; (b) that the law of the state of Y regards 
it as one of substance or capacity and the law of the state of X 
as one of form. 51 
... Bar, op. cit., 506; Crome, Allgemeiner Teil der modernen franzosischen 
Privatrechtswissenschaft, 88 and note 55; 1 Regelsberger, Pandekten, 172; 
1 Stobbe. Handbuch des deutschen Privatrechts (2d ed.), sec. 32; Venzi, 
Foro italiano, 1904, 1, 763; 2 Zitelmann, op. cit., 131. 
•
7Vorschlage und Materialien zum Entwurf eines biirgerlichen Gesetz-
buchs, 261. 
"Kahn, 30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher, 91, 95-97. See also Baudry-Lacantinerie 
& Wahl, Successions, Vol. I, 654; Trib. de Ia Chatre, July 5, 1910, Clunet 
1911, 588 and note. 
••see (1919) 28 Yale Law Journal 492. 
""Fedozzi, II diritto processuale civile internazionale, 534-535; Kahn, 
30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher, 133. 
61There is much controversy whether the question relates to form or 
substance. See Cass. Florence, Nov. 12, 1897, Monitore, 1898, 245 (sub-
stance); Cass. Rome, April 24, 1876, Giurisprudenza italiana XXVIII, 1, 
708 (form); Niedner, op. cit., 35 (form); 2 Zitelmann, op. cit., 154 (form). 
Cf. Contuzzi, II diritto ereditario internazionale, 533-538. 
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Is the will valid in the state of Z if both the states of X and Y 
regard the question as one of form, but the law of the state of Z 
looks upon it as one of substance or capacity? 
Bartint>2 would decide the above cases in accordance with the 
law of the forum. DienaGa would apply the law of the forum to 
the cases presented in the first paragraph and the law of the states 
of X and Y to the case mentioned in the last paragraph. 
(2) The law of X forbids its subjects to execute a holographic 
will irrespective of the place of execution. A, of the state of X, 
executes such a will in the state of Y, in which state holographic 
wills are permitted. Is the will valid in the state of Y? In the 
state of Z? 
Most courts54 and authors55 give effect to the law of X. The 
French Court of Cassat~on, 56 the Appellate Court of Orleans, 57 
Bartin58 and Diena59 would apply the law of the forum. Buzzatti50 
and Fedozzi61 hold that the question is dearly one of form and 
that the will is therefore valid if it conforms to the law of the 
place of execution.62 
Rights of Surviving Widow CPS belonging to Law of Succession 
or to Law of Matrimonial Property. Under the continental law 
"'Bartin, Clunet 1897, 236, 480, 490-491; Reprint 14, 48, 58-59. 
"'Diena, Sui limiti, 30. Fedozzi would also support the validity of the 
will in this case. Op. cit., 825 . 
.. Belgium: App. Liege, June 18, 1874, Pasicrisie 1874, 2, 301; Trib. civ. 
Brussels, July 21, 1886, Pandectes fram;aises 1887, 5, 7; Clunet 1887, 495, 
Feb. 10, 1892, Pasicrisie 1892, 3, 139. France: Trib. civ. Seine, Aug. 13, 
1903, Clunet 1904, 166; Trib. civ. Term.onde, March 24, 1907, Clunet 1908, 
885. Holland: Trib. Amsterdam, July 6, 1885, Clunet 1889, 175; Feb. 15, 
1901, Clunet 1903, 417; Weekblad von het Recht, no. 7624. Italy: App. 
Genoa, Aug. 4, 1891, Foro Italiano 1892, 1, -116; Clunet 1893, 955; Cass. 
'l'urin April 12, 1892, Clunet 1894, 1083; Monitore 1892, 346; Annali 1i892, 
1, 242; Foro italino 1892, 801-802. 
""Despagnet, Clunet 1898, 267; Durand, op. cit., 401-402; 1 Laurent, 
Principes de droit civil frant;ais, 159; 6 Laurent, Le droit civil international, 
695; Renault, Revue critique de legislation, 1884, 736; 2 Rolin, Principes 
de droit international prive, 406; Di Stefano-Napolitani, La masima 
"locus regit actum.'' 58-59; Surville & ·Arthuys, op. cit., 20, note 277; 4 
Weiss, oP. cit., 667. 
""Cass. Aug. 25, 1847, Dalloz 1847, 1, 273 . 
.,. App. Orleans, A:ug. 4, 1859; Dalloz 1859, 2, 158. 
""Clunet 1897, 229, 233, 236, 480; Reprint 7, 11, 14, 48. 
""Sui limiti, 26. 
00Di una neuva categoria di conflitti di leggi.-I conflitti di qualificazione 
(Studi giuridici varii pel cinquantesinio anno d' insegnamento di Enrico 
Pessina, Vol. III; Reprint, 16. 
61!1 digesto italiano, vol. 22', 828. 
"'See also Colin, Clunet 1897, 937; Pillet, Clunet 1894, 722. 
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it is sometimes exceedingly difficult to know whether the rights of 
the surviving widow are given to her as a result of the matrimonial 
property regime or as a right of succession. Where there has been 
a change of domicil or nationality after the celebration of the 
marriage, the question whether the personal law at the time of 
the marriage or at the time of death will determine her rights may 
depend, therefore, upon this preliminary question. 
The writers discussing this subject are inclined to make a dis-
tinction between the cases which are connected with the law of 
the forum by reason of the decedent's nationality or domicil and 
the cases where the law of the forum has no such connection with 
the subject. In the former situation Catellani63 would apply the 
law governing the succession, and in the second, the "competent" 
law. Bartin64 contends in favor of the law of the forum in both 
cases. 
Civil or Commercial Acts. In continental countries special 
rules are often applicable to "commercial acts." This is true not 
only from the standpoint of the strictly internal law but also from 
that of the conflict of laws.65 As the definition of a "commercial" 
act varies, the problem is whether the preliminary question as to 
what constitutes such act is to be determined by the strictly local 
law of the forum or whether the qualification of the foreign law 
shall be adopted. 
Practically all are agreed that the lex fori will control with 
respect to the character of an act as commercial or civil if the 
ultimate question relates to the jurisdiction of courts.66 Where 
the ultimate question involves the substantive rights of the parties 
some67 would make the intention of the parties the controlling test, 
others68 would apply the law of the place of contracting without 
""2 Cattellani, op. cit., 424 . 
.. Bartin, Clunet 1897, 236, 480, 726; Reprint, 14, 48, 70. 
""Italy, Art. 58, Commercial Code. 
"'Bustamante, Autarquia, 232; 2 Catellani, op. cit., 424; Cavaglieri, II 
Diritto Commerciale, 1910, 37; Fedozzi, II diritto processuale civile inter-
nazionale, 328. But see Calvo, Le droit international (5th ed.) 394. 
"'App. Milan, July 1, 1914, Foro italiano, 1914, 1, 1326; Rivista di 
diritto intemazionale, 1914, 610, (1919) 28 Yale Law Journal 806; Asser 
& Rivier, op. cit., 187-188; Bustamante, Autarquia, 232; Grasso, Principii 
di diritto intemazionale 279. Olivi, Manuale di diritto internazionale (2d 
ed.), 848-849; Surville & Arthuys, op. cit., 641. 
681 Diena, Diritto commerciale intemazionale, 62; 35 Rivista italiana 
per le scienze giuridiche 1903, 364; Valery, op. cit., 1251. 
HeinOnline  -- 20 Colum. L. Rev. 259 1920
QUALIFICATIONS AND CONFLICT OF LAWS 259 
reference to the intention of the parties, and still others,69 the law 
of the _forum. 
The above are the principal questions which have been consid-
ered by the continental writers in connection with the problem of 
qualifications. Let us consider now the theories that have been 
proposed for the solution of the general problem. 
General Theories 
Bartin. Of the various attempts to formulate a general theory 
for the solution of the problems above outlined Bartin's "theory 
of qualifications" was the first to attract general attention. This 
writer maintains that whenever the application of the· internal law 
of the forum or that of another country depends upon the nature 
of a particular juridical relationship, it is the law of the forum 
which must decide what the nature of the relationship is. The 
reasoning by which this conclusion is reached is tlie following. 
Barton starts with the fundamental proposition that the law of the 
forum in authorizing the application of foreign law voluntarily 
restricts its own sovereignty. When the judge of the forum is 
directed, therefore, to apply foreign law to a particular legal insti-
tution or relationship, it is evident that the extent of the limitation 
upon the sovereignty of the former must be measured by the notion 
which the law of the forum entertains of such institution or rela-
tionship. A state cannot possibly be deemed to have entrusted 
the foreign law with the duty of determining which juridical rela-
tionships belong and which do not belong to the institution which 
the law of the forum intended to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
foreign law. If it did so the law of the forum would not define 
the extent of its obligation with reference to the foreign sovereignty 
as it has a right to do, for it would be the foreign law-the foreign 
sovereignty-that would in reality determine in such a case the 
extent of such obligation. By giving to the institution a wider 
meaning than it has under the law of the forum the foreign law 
would be able to extend the obligation indefinitely. The result 
would be that the law of the forum would no longer be master 
in its own home.70 
Bartin would apply the law of the forum also in the case where 
the juridical relationship as such had in its origin no connection 
""Cavaglieri, I1 Diritto Commerciale, 1910, 50; 1 Lyon-Caen & Renault, 
Traite de droit commercial, (4th ed.) no. 183. 
"ZOC!unet 1897, 236-239; Reprint 14-17. 
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with the law of the forum, and the foreign country or countries 
with which it was so connected qualify it in a different manner. 
He would do so without regard to the fact whether or not the 
qualification of one of the foreign laws agrees with the qualification 
of the forum. He is led to this conclusion through the following 
process of reasoning. The system of qualifications of the law of 
the forum is the necessary complement of the system of private 
international law which the law of the forum has adopted. Both 
are expressions of its idea concerning its own sovereignty and the 
limitation thereon which it feels bound to admit. As there is no 
authority other than that of the state which has power to define 
the sovereignty of such state and the extent to which the inter-
national community of nations limits its sovereignty and its laws 
enacted thereunder, each state is invested in the nature of things 
with the power to fix the extent itself, and in doing so it draws 
its inspiration necessarily not from the arbitrary counsels of comity 
but from the idea it entertains of sovereignty in general, including 
its own sovereignty. This notion of sovereignty on which this 
system of private international law rests together with its system 
of qualifications, which is the necessary complement thereto, is the 
expression of its conception of the requirements of international 
justice. It follows, therefore, that it must apply the same notion 
and everything depending thereon to the other states as well as to 
itself. When the judge has before him, therefore, two different 
qualifications of the same legal relationship, that is, two different 
expressions of sovereignty, he must naturally follow exclusively 
the qualification which results from his own notion of sovereignty. 
This notion the forum has constructed in an abstract, impersonal 
and disinterested manner, so that it may serve within its own terri-
tory for the purpose of separating the domain of its own law from 
the domain of the foreign law, as well as separating the domain 
of one foreign law from that of anotherY· 
To the rule that the law of the forum must qualify all juridical 
relationships Bartin will recognize two exceptions : ( 1) With 
respect to the determination of a thing as movable or immovable 
he would apply the law of the situs, not because such law has 
sovereign authority over the soil but because it subserves best the 
security of transactions affecting property ;72 (2) In the matter 
of contracts Bartin would determine the lex loci contractus, where 
,.,Clunet 1897, 469-470; Reprint 37-38. 
72Clunet 1897, 250-253; Reprint 29-32. 
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the contract is made by correspondence, not with reference to the 
law of the forum but with reference to that law applicable to the 
case which would postpone its formation longest.73 
, A number of writers agree in general with Bartin's theory.74 
Donnedieu de Vabres75 takes issue, however, with Bartin's view 
that the application of foreign law by the law of the forum involves 
a limitation of its own sovereignty. This writer maintains that 
an appropriation of the foreign law that seems best to the forum 
constitutes an exercise of its own sovereignty and that it would be 
an abdication of such sovereignty if the forum should consult 
another qualification than its own. 
Buzzatti. Originally Buzzatti agreed with Bartin only to the 
extent of holding that the determination of domicil and perhaps 
certain other points of contact must be governed by the law of 
the forum. As regards the other problems he felt that the cases 
discussed by Bartin resulted not so much from a difference in the 
laws of the different countries as from an erroneous interpretation 
and application of such laws.76 Buzzatti has, however, modified 
his opinion since the time of the publication of his original article 
on the subject, so that his views coincide today more nearly with 
those expressed by Bartin.77 
Diena. Where the conflict in qualification is between the law 
of the forum and that of a foreign system Diena would agree with 
Bartin's conclusion. But where the only connection of the case 
with the law of the forum is the fact that suit is brought there 
Diena would not apply the qualification of the law of the forum 
whenever the foreign systems agree among themselves on the 
qualification of the legal transaction. In this case he would accept 
the common foreign qualification.78 
Kahn. Kahn dealt with most of the problems contained in 
this article a considerable time before Bartin advanced his theory 
of qualifications.79 Under the head of "Collisions in the Point of 
73Clunet 1897, 476; Reprint 44 . 
.. The following writers agree with Bartin's _general conclusion. 
Anzilotti, Rivista di diritto intemazionale, 1914, 614; Cavaglieri, II Diritto 
Commerciale, 1910, 53; Fedozzi, II digesto italiano.-Diritto intemazionale. 
-Successione, Vol. 22", 810; Venzi, Foro italiano, 1904, 1, 761. 
""Clunet 1905, 1234. 
700p. cit., 15-17. 
"'Professor Buzzatti had the kindness so to inform the writer. 
'"Sui limiti all' applicabilita del diritto straniero, 30. 
79Kahn's view is adopted by Regelsberger. 1 Pandekten, 165. 
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Contact" he included nationality, domicil, lex loci contractus, lex loci 
solutionis, lex loci delicti, and the question of movable and im-
movable property. The other cases in which there is a difference 
in the qualification of juridical relations or institutions he discussed 
under the heading of "Latent Conflict of Laws." With respect to 
both classes of problems Kahn held that the law of the forum was 
alone competent to define the particular institution, relationship, 
or legal concept.80 He found it impossible, however, to apply this 
principle to the case of double nationality when the law of the 
forum is disinterested. In this case he would abandon the rule 
of nationality and substitute for it that of domiciJ.81 
Despagnet. Despagnet has advanced the proposition that the 
law governing the legal relationship must control also its qualifica-
tion. His argument in support of this conclusion is the following. 
When a judge, drawing his inspiration from his own law and the 
principles of private international law, decides that a foreign law 
should be applied to a particular juridical relationship, he must be 
understood as applying such law so far as it organizes and regu-
lates such relationship. Now the first point that attracts the atten-
tion of the legislator and the first thing determined by him is the 
nature or qualification of the relationship which he regulates. To 
disregard his decision in this respect is tantamount to a non-
application of the law to which the juridical relationship in question 
was on principle subject. If the national law has made a certain 
question one of capacity, can it be said that if the question is con-
verted into one of form by the law of the forum the law which 
should govern the capacity of individuals has been appiled? No! 
The very principle has been violated. What is of capital impor-
tance and what produces all subsequent juridical consequences is 
precisely the qualification to be given to a juridical relationship 
and it is a flagrant contradiction in fact to import the qualification 
of the forum and at the same time to pretend that one is following 
the foreign law. Take the classical example-Article 3, Para-
graph 3, of the French Civil Code, according to which the capacity 
of foreigners is regulated by the national law. This article is 
manifestly violated if we should say that the prohibition to make 
a will in holographic form which exists in Holland with respect to 
Dutch subjects is a question of form according to the French legis-
lation, when the national law of the Dutch subject has made of it 
'"30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher, 76, 91, 99. 
81Ibid., 69. 
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a question of capacity. It seems evident that the first consequence 
resulting from the adoption of a law for the regulation of a certain 
relationship is the necessity of adopting also the nature which 
it attributes to it and the qualification which it gives to the 
relationship. 82 
According to Despaguet, therefore, a judge must accept the 
qualification adopted. by the foreign law, in order to apply the latter 
in conformity with the rules of private international law sanctioned 
by his own law. This view is shared on principle by several other 
writers.83 
Gemma. According to this writer the principles of the conflict 
of laws should not be deduced from the function of the state and 
of the judge, but the norms for a state and judge should be deduced 
on the basis of the conflict of la\VS. Gemma would separate the 
juridical relations and institutions from the positive legislations of 
the various states, so that their function may be considered without 
bias with reference to the requirements of international life. The 
judge should, therefore, appreciate the qualification of legal trans-
actions solely with reference to that law which is most favorable 
to the development of the relationship itself in its extraterritorial 
aspect. According to Gemma the will of a Dutch subject executed 
in the holographic form in a cotintry in which such wills are per-
mitted should be recognized by the courts of other countries, not 
because the law of the forum regards the question as one of form 
(Bartin), nor because the national law governing in the system of 
the conflict of laws of the forum regards it as a question of 
capacity (Despaguet), but because a proper international order 
requires that persons abroad should be able to execute wills in as 
simple a form as possible and the holographic will best answer this 
requirement. The judge should have in mind the international 
principles and not those of the forum. Otherwise a real system 
of private international law can never be built up.84 
Jitta. This author rejects all mechanical applieation of the 
lex fori, the lex domicilii, the lex rei sitG!, the lex loci contractus, 
etc., and inquires always what are the reasonable requirements of 
international social life in the particular case. If a juridical rela-
tionship belongs to a particular local sphere he will apply the law 
of that sphere, including its qualification. The question whether 
property is inovable or immovable or whether a particular indi-
s:clunet 1898, 261-262. See also Despagn'et & de Boeck, op. cit., 357. 
83See 2 Catellani II diritto internazionale privato, 426. 
"'Propedeutica al diritto internazionale privato, 111-112. 
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vidual is a trader would be decided, therefore, in accordance with 
this principle by the law of the situs85 or by the law of the place 
where the business was carried on. If the juridical relationship 
belongs to international social life, as for example, a contract 
having direct -connection with several countries or states, the rule 
to be applied would be the "international-common" rule, if such 
can be found, and if none exists, the reasonable principles of inter-
national sociallife.86 It is apparent that in a system like this the 
conflict of qualifications presents no special problem and coincides 
in all cases with the general problem of the choice of law. 
English and American Law 
There is scarcely any discussion of the problem of the conflict 
of qualifications in the decisions of the English and American courts 
or by the Anglo-American text writers. The general attitude 
of the Anglo-American law with reference to the problem appears, 
however, to be clear, and with reference to some lines of cases a 
solution is clearly established by authority. 
Movable and immovable property. The law of the situs controls 
the question whether property or an interest therein is to be 
regarded as movable or immovable property. This question was 
clearly decided in Johnstone v. Baker,87 where it was held that a 
Scotch heritable bond, that is a mortgage deed on Scotch realty, 
which was in the possession of an English testator, being regarded 
by Scotch law as an integral part of the realty, would be deemed 
real estate in England for the purpose of descent. English law 
was held to control as the le:c rei sitce and not as the le:c fori in 
other cases also in which the situs of the land was in England. 
Chatfield v. Berchtoldf88 raised the question whether a rent charge 
pur outre vie issuing out of English land, owned by a person 
domiciled in Hungary, was liable to legacy duty as personal estate 
under the English statutes, which make estates pur outre vie 
applicable as personal estate in the hands of an executor and admin-
istrator. It was assumed throughout the case that the English law 
as the law of the situs would determine the real or personal nature 
of the interest in question. In Freke v. Lord Carbery89 it was 
""La methode, 125. See also internazionaal Privatrecht, 69-71. 
80La methode, 136. 
81 (1819) 4 Madd. 474, n. 
88 (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. 192 . 
.. (1873) L. R. 16 Eq. 461. 
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held that the validity of a testamentary disposition of an English 
leasehold was governed by the law of England as the law of the 
situs, and not by that of the testator's domicil. The same principle 
was applied to the devolution of a leasehold in case of intestate 
succession in Dttncan v. Lawson.90 In the same way, the character 
of a mortgage on realty as movable or immovable property has been 
determined by the law of the situs.91 
Domicil. The English courts have been guided in the deter-
mination of domicil exclusively by English law and have paid no 
attention whatever to the foreign law. The attitude of the English 
law is well expressed by the Master of Rolls, Sir Nathaniel Lindley, 
in the case of In re Martin, in which the learned judge says :92 
"The domicil of the testatrix must be determined by the Eng-
lish Court of Probate according to those legal principles applicable 
to domicil which are recognised in this country and are part of its 
law. Until the question of the domicil of the testatrix at the time 
of her death is determined, the Court of Probate cannot tell what 
law of what country has to be applied. The testatrix was a French-
woman, but it would be -contrary to sound principle to determine 
her domicil at her death by the evidence of French legal experts. 
The preliminary question, by what law is the will to be governed, 
must depend in an English Court on the view that Court takes of 
the domicil of the testatrix when she died. If authority for these 
statements is wanted, it will be found in Bremer v. Freeman, Dog-
lioni v. Crispin, and In re Trufort. In each of the last two cases a 
foreign Court had determined the domicil, and the English Court 
had also to determine it, and did determine it to be the same as 
that determined by the foreign Court. But, as I understand those 
cases, the English Court satisfied itself as to the domicil in the 
English sense of the term, and did not simply adopt the foreigu 
decisions. The course universally followed when domicil has to be 
decided by the Courts of this country proceeds upon the principles 
to which I have alluded." 
The only English case suggesting a different proposition is that 
of In re Joh11,son.93 In that case Justice Fanvell expressed the 
opinion that an English woman could acquire no domicil in Baden, 
although she resided permanently in the grand-duchy because the 
law of Baden determined the question before the court by the law 
of nationality and paid no regard to that of domicil. 
00 (1889) L. R 41 Ch. D. 394. 
ll1Newcomer v. Orem (1852) 2 Md. 297; Crandell v. Barker (1898) 8 
N. Dak. 263, 78 N. W. 347; Martin v. Stovall (1899) 103 Tenn. 1, 52 
S. W. 296; In re Hoyles (1910, C. A.) 27 T. L. R 131. 
"
2 (1900) P. D. 211, 227. 
""(1903) 1 Ch. 821. 
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"No change is effectual," said the learned judge, "unless the 
factum is proved, and the factum cannot exist in a country where 
the law refuses to recognize it. The result is that this court must 
conclude that a domicil of choice, ineffectual to create any rights 
and liabilities governing the distribution of movables in the country 
supposed to have been chosen, is for this purpose no domicil at all, 
and that the propositus, therefore, is left with his domicil of origin 
unaffected. The Baden courts would in effect have disavowed him 
and disclaimed jurisdiction. This appears to me to be the logical 
result of the application of our rules respecting domicil and to be in 
accordance with justice."94 
Westlake95 has given his approval to the above reasoning. "On 
the main point," he says, "the judgment, as well as the reasoning 
which has been quoted from it, was in accordance with the doctrine 
which I have advocated." Dicey96 is of the opinion that all that 
Westlake probably meant to say was that the legal effects of domicil 
were to be determined solely with regard to the foreign law and 
without reference to the legal effect of domicil under the law of the 
forum. This thought is expressed by Westlake in another place 
where he says that "no one can acquire a personal law in the 
teeth of that law itsel£."97 In other words, the English judge 
should not apply the foreign law if it does not want to be applied. 
This is in accordance with Westlake's general view concerning the 
application of foreign law, for Westlake supports the renvoi theory 
in the sense of the "desistement" or mutual disclaimer of jurisdic-
tion theory.98 As Farwell in the second line of reasoning in 
rn re Johnson employed the renvoi proper reasoning which west-
lake disapproves, the latter preferred to accept the learned judge's 
first argument. 
It is obvious, however, that Farwell was in error when he 
assumed that the Baden law refused to recognize the factum of 
domicil. There is no doubt whatever that Miss Johnson was domi-
ciled in Baden according to Baden law. The Baden courts would 
take jurisdiction and distribute the property left by her in Baden, 
but such distribution would be made in accordance with the rule 
of the conflict of laws then established in Baden, namely, the 
decedent's national law. 
"'Ibid. 828. 
"'Private International Law (5th ed.) 41. 
00Conflict of Laws (2d ed.), 118. 
910p. cit., 353. 
••op cit. See 10 Columbia Law Rev. 190, 327; 27 Yale Law Journal, 
509; 29 ibid., 214. 
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The decision of In re Joh11son was followed by In re Bowes,99 
without any written opinion. 
Relying upon the above cases Hibbert100 states the following 
two propositions as existing English law: ( 1) The law of the 
locality in question must recognize that domicil results from the 
party's presence within its territory; (2) The requirements, if any, 
for the acquisition of a domicil, imposed by the law of the locality 
in which the party permanently resides must have been complied 
with. It is submitted, however, that there is no warrant for the 
conclusions just stated, for the conflict in the cases relied upon by 
Hibbert turns actually upon a difference in the ru1es of the conflict 
of laws and not upon a difference in the conception of domicil. So 
far as the case of In re Johnson may hold by way of implication 
that a domicil Ca.nnot be establi:>hed iri a country without a com-
pliance with the rules of such state relating to domicil, it is contrary 
to the established law of England. 
In the United States there are no cases containing any such 
suggestions regarding domicil as those found in In re J ohns01~. 
On the contrary, there are a number of decisions showing that a 
domicil may be established in another state or in a foreign country 
without reference to the notion of domicil in the law of such state 
or country.101 The case of In re Colburn's Estate102 is no excep-
tion to the rule. In that case the Supreme Court of Iowa decided 
in favor of an Iowa domicil, but in so doing referred to the Okla-
homa "business domicil" statute. Such reference did not, how-
ever, necessarily involve the assumption that the Oklahoma law 
would be controlling on the issue of domicil, but rather that the 
statute in question while purporting to impose an Oklahoma domicil 
in certain cases in fact merely prescribed the devolution of local 
property. The cases in general show clearly that the question of 
domicil is to be decided by reference to the "general" or inter-
national law as incorporated into the law of the forum and not by 
reference to any foreign jurisdiction. 
Lez loci contractus. No English or American cases have been 
found which have raised the question whether the lez loci con-
tractus of a contract made by correspondence should be determined 
.. (1906) 22 T. L. R 711. 
100!nternational Private Law, 13-14. 
101Harr.al v. Wallis (1883) 37 N. J. Eq. 458, affirmed under name of 
Harral v. Harral (1884) 37 N. J. Eq. 279; Dupuy v. Wurtz (1873) 53 
N.Y. 556; In re Martin's Estate (1916) 94 Misc. 81, 157 N. Y. Supp. 474. 
102 (Iowa, 1919) 173 N. W. 35. 
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by the law of the forum or by the law of some other state. In 
the cases raising the question the foreign law was either assumed 
to be identical with that of the forum with respect to the place 
where the contract was made, or the question was held to depend 
upon the intention of the parties/03 so that it was not necessary 
to consider the question under discussion. There would appear 
to be no doubt, however, that the law of the forum controls. 
Capacity or form. This question was raised in Ogden v. 
Ogden.104 A Frenchman, domiciled in France, married an English-
woman in England without the consent of his parents, which con-
sent was required by French law, though not by English law. He 
subsequently obtained a decree of nullity in France for want of 
such consent. The woman thereupon married again. On discover-
ing the existence of the first marriage her husband sued for divorce 
in England on the ground of bigamy. The Court of Appeal 
decided in his favor on the ground that the French decision of 
nullity was void, being contrary to the English rules of the con-
flict of laws, namely, that the consent of parents is a matter of 
formality and subject therefore to the law of the place where the 
marriage was celebrated. 
In view of the above cases it may be asserted that according to 
Anglo-American law the qualification of legal transactions as well 
as the definitions of "domicil," "the law of the place of contracting," 
and of the other "points of contact" are governed in general by the 
strictly internal law of the forum, the principal exception to the ruie 
being that the character of property as movable or immovable is 
controlled by the law of the situs. This conclusion is also the only 
one that is consistent with the Anglo-American theory of the 
conflict of laws. 
Anglo-American law agrees thus in substance with the con-
clusion reached by Bartin and Kahn. The point at issue between 
the foreign writers is nothing less than a fundamental difference 
in their conception of the conflict of laws. Bartin and Kahn are 
nationalists in their viewpoint while Despagnet and Gemma are 
internationalists. As the difference between these schools may be 
found in some of the most recent treatises on the conflict of laws 
in English105 only a few words need be said concerning them in 
this place. Both nationalists and internationalists differ among 
"'"Hansen v. Dixon (1.906) 23 T. L. R. 56. 
1"'(1908) P. 46. 
105Beale, Conflict of Laws, 86, et seq.; Baty, Polarized Law, 148 et seq.; 
Bar. Private International Law, 42 et seq. 
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themselves. A common characteristic of all internationalists is 
their position that the rules of the conflict of laws are dictated 
to the individual states, from without by some species of inter-
national law. According to them there is but a single system of 
the conflict of laws, the rules of which are binding for purely inter-
national reasons. The nationalists are agreed, on the other hand, 
that the rules of the conflict of laws form a part of the national 
law of each state and that there are, therefore, as many systems 
of the conflict of laws as there are independent states. Given this 
difference in their point of view it is natural that the international-
ists should attempt to find some "international" solution for the 
problem of qualifications, and that the nationalists should be con-
tent to solve it with reference to the law of each state. 
That the international theory is idealistic and not in accord 
with reality is obvious. International law has not furnished the 
existing rules of the conflict of laws; nor does it impose to-day 
in this respect upon the nations any far-reaching obligations. 
Indeed, Anglo-American writers and the nationalists in general 
are in the habit of asserting that international law leaves the 
different nations absolutely free in regard to the adoption of their 
rules of the conflict of laws, and that they may, if they desire, 
adjudicate all cases in accordance with their own rules' of internal 
law.106 This position, however, qmnot be maintained, for there is 
a.well established rule of internart:ionallaw which forbids a funda-
mental denial of justice to aliens.107 We must agree also with 
Kahn108 that no state is authorized at the present development of 
'
00"lt foilows from the independence of each state within its own borders 
that it might without contravening any .principles of international law 
regulate every set of circumstances which cails for decision exclusively 
by its own law." Hoiland, Jurisprudence (lOth ed.) 402. To the same 
effect, Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed.), 25; Wheaton, International Law 
(9th ed.) 133-134; Woolsey, International law (6th ed.) 102-109; Baty, 
op. cit. 9; Hail, International law (8th ed.) 51; Lawrence, International 
law (4th ed.) 246; Twiss, Law of Nations, new ed., 261. The continental 
writers hold that the exclusion of ail foreign law would be regarded today 
as a violation of international duty. Bluntschli, Das modeme Volkerrecht, 
27-28; Diena, Principi di diritto intemazionale, 23; Kahn, 40 Jhering's 
Jahrbuche~ 40. -
wBorchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 13, 178, 196-199, 
330 et seq. 
""40 Jhering•s J ahrbUcher, 40. Kahn is inclined to add to the above 
some special roles, for example, that the law of the situs controls as to 
property rights in immovables and that a state is not authorized to extend 
its roles governing domestic relations and the law of inheritance to persons 
temporarily within the state. These rules having been foilowed con-
sistently by the great majority of states, a deviation therefrom would, 
according to Kahn, constitute a breach of an international legal duty. 
Ibid 41-42. 
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international relations to exclude the application of foreign law 
altogether or to act arbitrarily in the application of its rules of 
the conflict of laws. Suppose, for example, that the state of X 
should debar from local recognition all marriages except those 
consummated within its territory and thC!Jt an American husband 
and wife, who had taken up their residence in the state of X, 
should be prosecuted for illicit relations. Or suppose that the 
state of X should admit alien residents and then refuse recognition 
to titles to personal property acquired under foreign law. Can 
_there be any doubt, if the government of the United States should 
file a protest against such "outrageous" legislC~Jtion for the protec-
tion of American citizens that international law would support 
its claim? 
While the existence of external restraint cannot, therefore, 
be denied altogether, the fact remains nevertheless that up to the 
present time, barring treaty provisions and such genera~ principles 
of international law as there may be which debar the local sovereign 
from adopting rules of conflict drastically oppressive, the national 
legislator or the courts of a state can adopt any rules of the conflict 
of laws whatever. The assertion on the part of the Anglo-
American courts and of the jurists representing the nationalistic 
theory of the conflict of laws that the extent of the application of 
foreign law in a given state depends, with the above reservations, 
upon the consent of such states is based, therefore, upon fact. 
Assuming, then, that .the international theory of the conflict 
of laws rests almost wholly upon fiction let us consider briefly the 
Anglo-American theory and its relation to the problem of qualifica-
tions. Anglo-American courts and writers, following Huber's 
usage, frequently say that the application of foreign law rests 
upon "comity." Continental writers take strong exception to this 
viewpoint on the mistaken assumption that comity connotes arbi-
trary conduct and the absence of the idea of justice.109 In fact it 
""The foreign writers of today are practically unanimous in condemn-
ing the theory of comity. See, however, Torres Campos, Elementos de 
derecho internacional privado, (4th ed.) 108; Aubry, Clunet 1901, 664. 
Bustamante says concerning comity: 
"Comity is a pretext for the evasion of the consequences of a strict 
territorial law. After the notion of such law is denied, it would be idle 
to combat it, for it becomes unnecessary. But it may not be amiss to 
observe that in its obscure and little defined concept, interest, courtesy, 
and reciprocity, ideas so important for the history of law, play a part 
. . . The name of science cannot be given to them, nor can a practical 
and useful system be based upon them. They authorize simply conces-
sions ungoverned by rule, the supposed independence of a state consisting 
in an adjustment of its conduct to that followed by other states, resulting 
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is fully recognized in England and in this country, as well as on 
the continent, that the application of foreign law results from the 
dictates of justice and from the mutual convenience of nations as 
understood and applied by the courts of the forum.U0 Speaking 
generally, it may be said that Anglo-American law still accepts 
the maxims first formulated by Huber regarding the basis of the 
conflict of laws. These maxims are the following ;111 
" ( 1) The laws of each state have force within the limits of 
that government and bind all subject to it, but not beyond. 
"(2) All persons within the limits of a government, whether 
ultimately in a real isolation between the people of the different countries, 
and in making of courtesy and reciprocity a system of reprisal, instead 
of a furtherance of juridicial relations." Tratado de derecho internacional 
privado, 456. The key to the continental point of view may be found 
in the fact that the word "comity'' on the continent is regarded as opposed 
to "justice." The plain truth is, of course, that our courts are guided 
in the application of foreign law by the same sense of duty as they are 
in the application of purely interuallaw. Concerning the subject see more 
fully 13 Illinois Law L. Rev. 396-401; Wigmore, Celebration Legal Essays, 
220-225. 
=story says : ' 
"It has been thought by some jurists that the term comity is not suffi-
ciently expressive of the obligation of nations to give effect to foreign 
laws when they are not prejudicial to their own rights and interests. 
And it has been suggested that the doctrine rests on a deeper foundation; 
that it is not so much a matter of comity or courtesy as a matter of para-
mount moral duty. Now assuming that such a moral duty does exist, it 
is clearly one of imperfect obligation, like that of beneficence, humanity, 
and charity. Every nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of 
the nature and the extent of the duty, but of the occasions on which its 
e.xereise may be justly demanded. And certainly there can be no pretence 
to say that any foreign nation has a right to require the full recognition 
and execution of its own laws in other territories, when those laws are 
deemed oppressive or injuries to the rights or interests of the inhabitants 
of the latter, or when their moral character is questionable, or their pro-
visions are impolitic or unjust. . . . 
"The true foundation on which the administration of international law 
must rest is, that the rules which are to govern are those which arise 
from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences which 
would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity 
to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return . . : 
"There is then not only no impropriety in the use of the phrase 'coQlity 
of nations,' but it is the most appropriate phrase to express the true 
foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within 
the territories of another. It is derived alto~ether from the voluntary 
consent of the latter, and is inadmissible when tt is contrary to its known 
policy or prejudicial to its interests. In the silence of any positive rule 
affirming or denying or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts 
of justice presume the tacit adoption of them by their government, unless 
they are repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interests. It is not 
comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation, which is administered 
and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning, by 
which all other principles of the municipal law are ascertained and guided." 
Op. cit., 32, 33, 35. 
nu'Praclcct." pt. 2, bk 1, tit. 3, n. 2. 
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they live there permanently or temporarily, are deemed to be sub-
jects thereo£.112 
"(3) Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights· 
acquired within the limits of a government retain their force every-
where so far as they do not cause prejudice to the power or rights 
of such government or of its subjects." 
These maxims were approved by Story.113 Since Story the 
doctrine of the territoriality of laws has been regarded as the 
foundation upon which the Anglo-American system of the conflict 
of laws rests. 
Holland114 has called attention to the fact that Anglo-American 
courts in reality never enforce foreign laws but rights acquired 
under such laws. He says that what really happens when a law 
seems to obtain extraterritorial effect is that "rights created and 
defined by foreign law obtain recognition by the domestic tribunal." 
Dicey115 and Beale accept this view and the latter116 asserts that 
the common law has worked out indigenously a theory of "vested 
rights. " 117 
"The topic called 'Conflict of Laws'," says Beale, "deals with 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign-created rights."118 
And in regard to the law governing contracts he uses the 
following language: 
"The question whether a contract is valid, that is, whether to 
the agreement of the parties the law has annexed an obligation 
to perform its terms, can on general principles (§ 14) be deter-
mined by no other law than that which applies to the acts, that is, 
by the law of the place of contracting. If the law at that place 
annexes an obligation to the acts of the parties, the promisee has 
a legal right which no other law has power to take away except 
as a result of new acts which change it ( § 4). If on the other 
hand the law of the place where the agreement is made annexes 
no legal obligation to it, there is no other law which has power to 
do so."119 
:!Wfhe words "are to be deemed subjects thereof" are understood today 
as meaning "are to be deemed subject to its jurisdiction". 
mop. cit., sec. 20. 
mop. cit., 411. Cf. Kahn, 30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher 28. 
""Op. cit., 11, 26; 6 Law Quarterly Rev. 10; 7 ibid. 114. 
""Op. cit., 105. 
117For a criticism of the theory of vested rights see Wachter, 25 Archiv 
fiir die civilistische Praxis, 2 et seq. 
""Summary, sec. I. 
w Ibid. sec. 90. 
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"If the law of the place where the parties act refuses legal 
validity to their acts, it is impossible to see on what principle some 
other law may nevertheless give their acts validity. . . . 
"In all these cases the matter must, it seems, be determined 
theoretically by the law governing the transaction, i. e., the law of 
the place where the parties act in making their agreement. If by 
that law their acts have no legal efficacy, then no other state can 
give them greater effect. If by the law of that state their acts 
created a binding obligation upon the parties, then the parties who 
have acted under that law must be bound by it. . . . 
"This doctrine gives full scope to the territoriality of law, and 
enables each sovereign to regulate acts of agreement done in his 
own territory."120 
Beale's theory appears to be that there is a territorial law exclu-
sively applicable to a particular group of fact~ which must prevail 
in determining legal consequences. Several decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States lend support to the same 
doctrine. In Slaver v. Mexican National R. R. Co.,121 Mr. Justice 
Holmes says: 
_ "As Texas has statutes which give an action for wrongfully 
causing death, of course there is no general objection of policy 
to enforcing such a liability there, although it arose in another 
jurisdiction.122 But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdic-
tion foreign to the place of the wrongful act, obviously that does 
not mean that the act in any degree is subject to the lex fori, -with 
regard to either its quality or its consequences. On the other hand, 
it equally little means that the law of the place of the act is 
operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign suit 
is that, although the act complained of was subject to no law having 
force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which 
like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced 
wherever the person may be found.123 But as the only source 
of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that 
that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation/24 
but equally determines its extent."12:; 
'""23 Harvard Law Rev., 267, 268, 271. 
""(1904) 194 U. S. 120, 126, 24 Sup. Ct. 581. 
""Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R Co. (1897) 168 U. S. 445, 18 Sup. 
Ct. 105. 
=stout 1•. 'Wood (1820) 1 Black£. (Ind.) 71; Dennick v. Railroad Co. 
(1880) 103 u. s. 11. 
""Smith v. Condry (1843) 42 U. S. 28. 
""See also, Davis v. Mills (1904) 194 U. S. 451, 24 Sup. Ct. 692; West-
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Brown (1914) 2:U U.S. 542. 34 Suo. Ct. 955; Spokane 
Inland R. R. v. Whitley (1915) 237 U. S. 487, 35 Sup. Ct. 655. 
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Notwithstanding these statements by such eminent authorities, 
it is submitted that while the theory that a particular territorial 
law is exclusively applicable to a particular set of operative facts 
may be established in this country as a matter of constitutional law 
it cannot be accepted analytically as a sound basis for the conflict 
of laws. Where all the operative facts occur in a single state 
it may be conceded that as a matter of expediency the rights of the 
parties should be determined ordinarily in accordance with the law 
of such state. But if the forum sees fit it may adopt another rule. 
Where the operative facts occur in or affect more than one state, 
there is much greater difficulty in selecting the governing rule. 
Generally speaking Anglo-American law will incorporate the law 
of some particular foreign state. It will select at times the law 
of the place where the act was done or was to be performed; at 
other times the law of the situs of the property and not of the 
place of acting; at other times still it will choose neither the law 
of the place of acting nor that of the situs of the property but the 
law of the domicil. Where a contract is entered into through 
an agent, it will bind the principal in accordance with the law 
of the place where the agent acts, although the principal was never 
in the latter state and he had no capacity under the law of the 
state in which he was domiciled and in which he appointed the 
agent. Sometimes a legal transaction will be sustained if it con-
forms to the law of one of several states. 
That there is no logical necessity for the application of any 
particular rule selected by Anglo-American law is seen from the 
fact that different rules with respect to the same set of facts 
often prevail in foreign countries; Nor can our rules of the con-
flict of laws be explained by any theory of "territoriality," other 
than the general doctrine that the law of the forum selects the 
rules which shall controJ.126 In fact, the only answer that can 
be given to the question why the common law has chosen a particu-
lar rule to govern in the conflict of laws or in any other branch 
of law is that it has seemed to the forum sound policy to do so. 
That the English courts have not felt bound to attach the same 
legal consequences to the foreign operative facts, as is done by the 
law of the foreign state, appears clearly from Machado v. Fontes121 
and other English cases. In the former case the publication of a 
'"'See (1918) 27 Yale Law Journal 816: (1920) Yale Law Tournai. The 
confusion caused by the use of the word ~'territorial" in different senses 
has been admirably shown by Aubry, Clunet, 1900, 694; 1901, 254, 263. 
m(1897) 2 Q. B. 231. 
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libel occurred in Brazil and under the law of that state such 
publication constituted only a penal offense and gave rise to no 
private action, and yet the English Court of Appeal allowed such 
an action. It attributed therefore to the operative facts in Brazil 
other legal consequences than those attached thereto by the law of 
Brazil. In Pemberton v. H'ughe,s128 the Court of Appeal stated 
that it would recognize a Florida divorce, although such divorce 
was null and void under the law of Florida. 
When Anglo-American courts enforce a judgment from a 
continental country for the payment of money. they are in fact 
creating new rights, for in continental law a judgment entitles the 
party to execution, but does not constitute as it does in England 
and in this country a new cause of action.129 Speaking of the 
enforcement of judgments in general Cook says: 
"This clearly is a loose and technically erroneous way of putting 
the matter. What we ought to say is, that the common law of 
England and of each of the American states attaches to foreign 
judgments which comply with certain conditions the legal con-
sequences described in our law by the term debt. The action 
brought in a common law jurisdiction is for ·the purpose of enforc-
ing or vindicating that common law debt, not the foreign judgment. 
The latter is merely one of a set of operative facts which according 
to the principles of the common law result in a debt. Similarly, 
where a common law court permits an action of debt to be brought 
upon a chancery decree for the payment of money the common law 
court does not enforce the chancery decree in any way. It merely 
treats the latter as an operative fact which results in a common 
law debt, for the non-payment of which the common law court will 
give relief."130 
Hohfeld131 entertained the same view and made it the basis 
of his course on the conflict of laws both at Leland Stanford and 
at Yale. His position was that the courts of a sovereign state may 
attach any legal consequences whatever to any state of facts, includ-
ing acts done in foreign countries. Cook makes in this regard the 
following observations :132 
"Aside from some existing system of positive law-constitu-
tional, statutory, or judge-made-it seems clear that there is no 
inherent reason why the law of any sovereign nation-England, 
""(1899) 1 Ch. (C. A.) 781. See also, Ogden v. Ogden (1908) P. 46. 
11'"Imperial Court of Germany, June 30, 1886, 16 R G. 427. 
13028 Yale Law Journal 71. · 
131See 9 Columbia Law Rev. 496, 520. 
:1:223 Yale Law Journal 69-70. 
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for C.'Cample-may not, if the sovereign English Parliament or the 
appropriate English court so decrees, attach any legal consequences 
whatever to any state of facts whatever, including acts done in 
other countries, even by persons not citizens or residents of Eng-
land. This simply amounts to saying that as a sovereign nation 
England may determine what legal consequences shall in England. 
by English courts, be held to attach to a given state of facts, if 
in any way the English court is presented with a case involving 
them. Suppose, for example, that an English statute should pro-
vide that any person whatsoever who, under the circumstances 
described in the statute, injured any other person anywhere in the 
world, should be deemed guilty of a tort and that if he ever came 
into England or owned any property there he should be subject 
to suit and damages assessed in a prescribed manner : surely the 
English courts would be bound to apply the statute to all cases 
coming within its scope. Clearly, also, they could not enforce the 
statute against persons committing the acts in question outside 
the jurisdiction so long as these persons both remained outside 
and had no property within the jurisdiction. To describe this 
&1tuation in appropriate legal terminology must we not say that 
such a statute would as a matter of substantive law create primary 
rights in every person in the world to have all other persons refrain 
from the described conduct, and that when anyone was guilty of 
those acts anywhere a secondary English right to damages would 
arise? This right could not, of course, be enforced so long as 
the tortfeasor both remained outside of England and had no prop-
erty there; but this is equally true where the tort is committed in 
England and the tortfeasor before action is brought, or even after 
it has been brought, leaves that jurisdiction and has no property 
within the same. That the law of England does not in fact 
attempt to go so far as in the case just put does not, then, show 
any inherent lack of power on the part of the English legislature 
or courts, but merely that they have refrained from establishing 
such a system for other reasons." 
As long as the Anglo-American notion of law is based upon 
the existence of physical force on the part of organized society,133 
""The continental writers are very much opposed to the Anglo-American 
conception of law. Law to them "is the direct consciousness, however 
produced, of a binding rule. . . . If it is the common consciousness 
of the nation, we have municipal or state law, iu its various branches. If 
it is the common consciousness of the civilized world, it may take various 
forms, which may all be classed as supra-national. It may regard the 
relations of States to one another; or it may regard the relations of indi-
viduals to one another." . . . 
"Still, whichever of these varying schools we side with, we shall find 
that the content of the common consciousness which they all postulate 
is very meagre indeed. In fact, there is no such common sense of what 
is binding in private relations which have an international side. 
"'We must, nevertheless, remember that it is quite possible that such 
common consciousness might exist, and that it is at any rate held by 
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all legal relations, including rights, duties, privileges, no-rights, 
powers, liabilities, immunities and disabilities must necessarily 
have reference to some particular territorial law. Each organized 
society, by virtue of its existence as a sovereign, is obliged to 
define for itself what rights, duties, privileges, etc., shall attach 
to the operative facts which may be presented for determination 
to its judicial or executive agents, without directions or sugges-
tions from the organized society withiq whose territory those facts 
may have occurred. Whether the operative facts happened wholly 
within its territory or partly or wholly without such territory can.._ 
not make any difference. "Rights"134 being the correlatives of 
"duties" for the non-performance of which organized society will 
inflict disagreeable consequences upon the person owing the duties, 
it is impossible, of course, to recognize that a party has a legal 
right in a given state if there are no remedies available in such 
state for its enforcement.135 
the vast majority of thinkers that, if it exists, and in so far as it exists, 
it is, properly speaking, law-Droit." Baty, op. cit., 150, 151. 
Baty accepts von Bar's view. "Von Bar, speaking of the theory that 
nothing is law which does not rest upon forcible legislation, observes-
'Is that not also law, which necessarily corresponds to the nature of the 
subject?' . : . By invoking the sense of binding obligation, which, 
in fact, does arise from the nature of things, he supplies Private Inter-
national Law with a real foundation apart from the law of any particular 
State. Of course, the obligation is nascent-in my view it is grotesquely 
rudimentary-but it is real, and not theoretical and 'imparfait'." Op. 
cit., 152. 
~hat the term "rights" should be used in this specific sense has been 
convincingly shown by Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913), 23 Yale Law Journal 16; 26 ibid. 710; 
See also, Cook, Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of Law (1919), 28 
Yale L. J. 721: Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology (1919) 29 Yale Law 
Journal 163. Holland says: "Every right, whether moral or legal, implies 
the active or passive furtherance by others of the wishes of the party 
having the right ·. . . When it will be -enforced by the power of the 
State to which they are amenable, it is their 'legal duty.' The correlative 
• • • of legal right is legal duty. These pairs of correlative terms 
express, it wiii be observed, in each case, the same state of facts viewed 
from opposite sides." Op. cit., 83. 
t::~Cf. Beale, Summary, Sec. 47: "A right having been created by the 
.appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow every-
where . . . 
"A slave for the same reason must be recognized as such, even in a 
free state. It is true that if a slave comes into a free state he cannot 
be restrained by his master ; not because he ceases to be a slave but 
because in such a state there is no right in a master to retrain a slave.'' 
Sec. 48: "Though a foreign right must be recognized as existing, it 
does not follow that it wiii be given any legal force. Since a right can 
have no legal force unless it is given force by law (§ 2), and since noth-
ing can have the force of law in a state except the law of that State (§ 11). 
it follows that no foreign right can be enforced unless the law of the 
State so provides. It depends upon the law as to the enforcement of 
foreign rights, that is, upon a principle of the Conflict of Laws." 
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But is the power of the forum to attach legal consequences to 
acts done in other countries not limited by international law? 
"Of course some other sovereign nation may object," says 
Cook, "on the ground that 'international law' is being violated, or 
on any other grounds it chooses to assert. The United States, for 
example, did this successfully in the Ctttting Case/36 in which 
Mexico claimed the right to punish an American citizen for acts 
done in the United States. It can hardly be asserted, however, 
that Mexican law was not law in Mexico, i. e., binding on the 
Mexican courts. If from the present war there emerges a real 
League of Nations with power to enforce its decrees, a different 
legal situation may result."137 
A sovereign state has, so far as its judicial or administrative 
agents are concerned, clearly the power to enforce any ru1es it 
pleases. Having this power to impose its will it may, of course, 
prescribe rules in contravention of international law. 
"If the legislature of a particular country," says Lord Chief 
Justice Cockburn, "should think fit by express enactment to render 
foreigners subject to its law with reference to offences committed 
beyond the limits of its territory, it would be incumbent on the 
courts of such country to give effect to such enactment, leaving 
it to the state to settle the question of international law with the 
governments of other nations."138 
Indeed, in this country the courts are bound by the Constitution 
of the United States to enforce the provisions of a federal statute 
which conflict with the express terms of a prior treaty.139 A dis-
crepancy between the municipal law and the international obliga-
tion of a state may impose upon the latter a duty to indemnify 
the party whose rights under international law have been violated, 
but cannot lead to a reversal of the actual decision of the case 
by the courts. So far as private rights are concerned there would 
appear to be no exception to or qualification of the above rule. 
In the domain of public law140 it is possible that an alien convicted 
=z Moore, Int. Law Dig. 228. 
m23 Yale Law Journal 69, note. 
138Reg. v. Keyn, L. R 2 Ex. D. 63, 160. 
""The Cherokee Tobacco Case (1870) 78 U. S. 616; The Head Money 
Cases (1884) 112 U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247; Alvarez y Sanchez v. United 
States (1910) 216 U. S. 167, 30 Sup. Ct. 361. 
1'"1'he Selective Draft Act of May 18, 1917, under the terms of which 
aliens who had declared their intention to become citizens of the United 
States were subject to military duty, created a situation where the muni-
cipal law of the land conflicted with the rules of international law. In 
conformity with the precedents above cited it was held that the provi-
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under a statute which violates his rights under international law 
may, upon the request of his government, be set free through the 
power of the executive branch of the government.141 
Although each state has the power to attach different legal 
consequences to a particular group of operative facts it would be, 
of course, highly inconvenient as well as unjust if that power were 
exercised in every instance. In the interest of a proper adminis-
tration of justice a state will, therefore, frequently attach to the 
operative facts occurring in a foreign state the same consequences 
attached thereto by the law of such state.142 The circumstances 
under which this will be done constitute the subject matter of the 
conflict of laws itself. 
In the light of the above discussion it must be apparent that ' 
the statements by courts and writers that some foreign law had 
the e%clusive power to "create" a particular right are, under the 
actual conditions under which the rules of the conflict of laws are 
administered, totally misleading. Such phrases must be. regarded 
merely as convenient forms of expressing the thought that the 
law of the forum under the facts of the case will grant to the 
parties the same rights as would be granted by the courts of a 
particular foreign state. There is grave danger, however, that 
the constant repetition of such phrases may induce the belief that 
the application of the foreign law is imposed upon the courts of 
the forum from without, when in truth the forum acts in perfect 
sions of the Act were binding upon the courts, even where they con-
flicted with the terms of a prior treaty. Ex Parte Larrucea (1917) 249 
Fed. 981. See 28 Yale Law Journal 83. Larrucea was set free, however, 
by order of the President as Commander-in-Chief of our army, upon 
the recommendation of the State Department, which admitted that the 
Act was in violation of our treaty with Spain. A number of South 
Americans were released in like manner without any existing treaty, on 
the general ground that the Selective Draft Act violated with respect to 
them the principles of international law. 
'"The statement that international law is a part of our national law 
(see The Nereide, (1815) 13 U. S. 388; The Scotia, (1871) 81 U. S., 
170, 187-188; The Paquete Habana (1899) 175 U. S. 677, 700, 20 Sup. Ct. 
290, must be understood. according to Foulke, in the sense that if no rule 
of municipal law is applicable to the case a court of justice will presume 
that the state would have enacted the proper rule of international law 
and by not enacting it left it to be understood that the municipal common 
law was in accordance with the obligation imposed on the state by the 
provisions of international law. 19 Columbia Law Rev. 495-460. 
International law, according to Foulke, regulates the conduct of states 
and municipal law that of individuals. It cannot be said, therefore, 
accurately that any rule of international law is ever a part of the municipal 
law. 19 Columbia Law Rev. 457-458. c£. Kaufmann, Die Rechtskraft des 
internationalen Rechts, 2. 
"
2Dicey, op cit., 8-10. 
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independence according to its own notions of what is right and 
proper. The statement criticized is perfectly consistent with the 
internationalistic theory of the conflict of laws/43 but not with 
the fundamental conceptions of law entertained by the courts of 
England and the United States. 
The problem has been discussed so far without reference to 
our American constitutions. The power of our legislatures and 
courts in the adoption of the rules of the conflict of laws is actually 
limited by various constitutional provisions,-especially those re-
lating to due process of law and the full faith and credit clause. So 
far as these have been or may be held to recognize the theory that 
rights arising out of acts or transactions without a state are the 
product of the exclusive operation of a particular law territorially 
governing the place where the operative facts occur, such theory 
is binding, of course, on principles of constitutional law. As all 
constitutional limitations are, however, in reality an integral part 
of the law of each state, it is therefore still perfectly accurate to 
say, even with respect to the law of the United States, that all rights 
are created by the forum. 
The qualification of legal transactions and the determination of 
domicil, lex loci contractus, and other points of contact upon which 
the application of foreign law depends, raises in view of the fore-
going developments no problem of any special difficulty. If the 
conflict of laws of the forum says that the law of the decedent's 
domicil governs the distribution of his personal estate it must mean 
that in the estimation of the forum such rule accords best with 
the probable expectation of the decedent144 or with the require-
ments of a good administration of justice, that is, with the require-
ments of international social life as conceived by the judge of the 
forum. A similar reason must underly the adoption of the lex loci 
contractus in the law of contracts, and all other rules of the con-
flict of laws. 
In the selection of the concept of "domicil", "kt: loci con-
tractus" and the like the courts of the forum might follow one 
of three conceivable methods. ( 1) They might attempt to find 
an international concept; (2) they might accept the concept of a 
foreign country; (3) they might choose the concept of their own 
municipal law or create one more in accordance with the needs of 
the case. Practically only the last two methods are available, for 
""1 Brinz, Dandektcn (2nd cd.) 104. 
"'28 Yale Law Journal 814. 
HeinOnline  -- 20 Colum. L. Rev. 281 1920
QUALIFICATIONS AND CONFLICT OF LAWS 281 
it is impossible with reference to any o£ the concepts under dis-
cussion to find one upon which the law of the dif!:erent couptries 
is agreed145• As regards the second method, the courts of the 
forum cannot follow, o£ course, the concept of the foreign state, 
the law of which is to be applied, for the application of the foreign 
law is dependent upon the preliminary determination of the con-
cept. The forum could select some particular foreign la'v for the 
determination of the <:oncept, but, as in the case of renvoi, there 
is ordinarily no reason why it should prefer a foreign concept to 
its own. Convenience has suggested, however, that the classifica-
tion of property as movable and immovable be referred to the law 
of its situs. Where the law of one of two foreign states is ap-
plicable under the law of the forum and the laws of the two states 
agree upon the qualification of the legal transaction the acceptance 
of the common qualification by the forum may also seem ex-
pedient146. With these reservations the forum should determine 
the legal concepts for itself. 
While the problem of qualifications is merely a phase of the 
general problem of the conflict of laws, so far as Anglo-American 
law and the nationalistic theory of the conflict of laws are con-
cerned, it has been a source of great embarrassment to the inter-
nationalists. The internationalistic theory, which is followed by 
most of the Italian and French writers, proceeds on the assump-
tion that there is but one system of the conflict of laws and that 
the rules thereof can be derived by a process of reasoning from 
some general principles which are deemed entitled to universal 
recognition and which must be accepted, therefore, as law147. But 
the discovery of a general problem in the conflict of laws, such as 
-that presented by the theory of qualifications, which does not ad-
mit of an "international" solution, proves, even from their own 
view-point, the unsoundness of their theory. Hence the earnest 
efforts on the continent to overthrow Bartin's theory of qualifica-
tions or to reduce its operation to the narrowest limits148. So far 
""See Kahn, 30 !bering's Jahrbiicher 67, 73, 98. 
"
8Concerning a similar exception with respect to rmvoi see 10 Columbia 
Law Rev. 331-332; 27 Yale Law Journal 529-530. 
msee Supra, foot-note 137. Of the foreign codes the Italian has gone 
furthest in the adoption of the intemationalistic theory. See Art. 8, Pre!. 
Disp. Civ. Code. 
''"It must be admitted, however, that Bartin has unduly extended the 
application of his theory of qualifications. A number of examples cited 
by him do not im·olve a conflict of qualifications in the above sense. See 
Pillet, Principes de droit international prive, 105. 
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as Despagnet's attempt to overthrow Bartin's theory is concerned, 
it manifestly begs the entire question. The qualification of a legal 
transaction cannot, in the nature of things, be determined by the 
law governing the transaction itself, inasmuch as the problem of 
qualifications, as it is understood in this article and as it is gen-
erally understood by the writers, is limited to the cases where the 
application of the foreign law depends upon the determination of 
the preliminary question. Under these circumstances it is impos-
sible, as has been shown, to decide the preliminary question by the 
law governing the transaction itself. 
Nor will the rules suggested by Gemma resolve the difficulty. 
The requirements of international life are too vague to furnish 
a standard for the solution of the problem under consideration149• 
The same objection may be raised also against the original theory 
of the conflict of laws developed by Jitta, except with respect to 
transactions which can be localized. So far as the question of the 
qualification of legal transactions is concerned, it would appear to 
coincide from Jitta's point of view with the general problem of 
the conflict of laws. Transactions not admitting of localization 
should be controlled, according to Jitta, by the international com-
mon rules, and in their absence, by the reasonable requirements 
of international social life. But these principles are not ready 
made, and it is difficult to see how an internationalization is pos-
sible of such concepts as "lex loci contractus", "capacity", "form", 
and the like upon which the application of foreign law is made 
to depend in the existing systems of the conflict of laws.150 It is 
apparent, therefore, that the conception of the conflict of laws as 
one system which shall decide a case in the different countries in 
the same manner, is a Utopia which cannot be attained until there 
exist ( 1) a complete accord, not only with respect to the rules of 
the conflict of laws of the different countries, but also with refer-
ence to the various concepts or qualifications of legal relations 
upon which the application of the foreign law depends, and (2) 
an International Supreme Court with power to control the applica-
tion of the concepts and qualifications to the facts of the case. 
ERNEST G. LORENZEN 
YALE LAw ScHOOL 
""'Cavaglieri, II Diritto Commerciale, 1910, 50; Fedozzi, Il Digesto, 810; 
Venzi, Foro italiano, 1904, 1, 761. 
100}itta himself acknowledges that a judge cannot give to a juridical 
relationship very well a character opposed to that given to it by his national 
law. La methode, 198. 
